El deporte como plataforma

Por Anwar Zibaoui, experto en temas árabes y mediterráneos (El Periódico, 28/08/2012).

En pleno debate sobre el impacto del deporte en la economía de una ciudad, como en Londres en los recientes Juegos Olímpicos o Río de Janeiro con los preparativos de los del 2016, una consultora ha valorado el PIB del fútbol mundial en más de 500.000 millones de dólares, lo que la convertiría en la 17ª economía del mundo, por encima de países como Suiza y Bélgica. ¿Se imaginan si sumamos la F-1 u otros deportes?

Los países del golfo Pérsico no dejan de sorprender a muchos con impresionantes proyectos para intentar diversificar sus economías más allá de los hidrocarburos y la capacidad de sus fondos soberanos para invertir a lo ancho del planeta. Pero es en su apuesta por el deporte donde más sorprenden. Recordemos la reacción de incredulidad cuando Catar ganó la organización del Mundial de fútbol del 2022. También es verdad que la tensión en la zona oculta a veces otras realidades más allá de la visión típica de los petrodólares. Esta apuesta por el deporte tiene detractores que creen que se tira el dinero solo para ganar títulos.

En esta región del planeta, el fútbol también es el deporte rey. Cuenta con millones de seguidores y equipos cada vez más conocidos gracias a fichajes como Maradona, Raúl… Pero esta historia empezó hace años. Tras el éxito inicial de Dubái para elevar su perfil internacional a través de torneos de tenis y golf, otros han seguido el ejemplo y hoy la región es sede de importantes citas deportivas, como la F-1 en Baréin y en Abu Dabi, los Juegos Asiáticos o el gran premio de motociclismo de Catar, y en Abu Dabi la Volvo Ocean Race. Para el futuro, además del Mundial de fútbol del 2022, Catar y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos preparan candidaturas para los Juegos Olímpicos del 2024. Y Arabia Saudí aspira a la Copa de Asia de Fútbol del 2019.

Y al tiempo que estos países se ofrecen para acoger eventos globales, realizan inversiones en el sector del deporte a través de acuerdos de patrocinio y participación en el capital. En el 2005, Emirates Airlines firmó un acuerdo de 162 millones de dólares con el Arsenal inglés. Incluye el patrocinio de camisetas y vallas publicitarias y el cambio del nombre del campo por el de Emirates Stadium. Desde 1987, esta aerolínea ha vinculado su nombre a todo tipo de deportes y es uno de los principales patrocinadores en el mundo. Invierte la mitad de su presupuesto de márketing (estimado en 1.003 millones de dólares) en patrocinios. Tiene alianzas con clubs como el Milan, el Real Madrid y el Paris Saint-Germain. Y es un socio oficial del Mundial de la FIFA. También patrocina el Abierto de EEUU de tenis, entre otros. Eso ha transformado a Emirates en una marca internacional y ha contribuido a su crecimiento, ya que es una de las principales aerolíneas del mundo y Dubái es un destino turístico líder.

En otros casos, el patrocinio por sí mismo no es suficiente. En el 2008, el Abu Dabi United Group compró el Manchester City, que la temporada pasada se proclamó campeón de la Premier inglesa, un trofeo que le ha costado mil millones de euros. El club firmó también con Etihad Airways de Abu Dabi un acuerdo por importe de 400 millones de libras que incluye los derechos de las camisetas y el cambio de nombre del estadio por el de Etihad Campus. La inversión forma parte de los planes para desarrollar la industria del turismo del emirato y hacer que su compañía de bandera sea un nombre familiar.

Aparte de la organización del Mundial, Catar compró el Paris Saint-Germain y el Málaga. Qatar Airways es la aerolínea oficial del Tour de Francia. Y, como es bien sabido, Qatar Foundation tiene un contrato con el FC Barcelona y aparece como patrocinador de su camiseta. Por su parte, la Qatarí Aspire Zone tomó el control del club de segunda división belga KAS Eupen. Y el Real Madrid interviene en la construcción de un parque temático de un billón de dólares en el emirato de Ras al-Khaimah, que se añade al parque temático de Ferrari en Abu Dabi. También emerge Al Jazira Sport al entrar en la puja con los proveedores de televisión de pago por las retransmisiones de las grandes citas deportivas.

El Golfo ha pasado de ser una región pobre, con la pesca de perlas como sustento, a tener una de las rentas per cápita más altas del mundo. En la zona todo cambia a ritmo rápido. Y ahora necesita desarrollar una estrategia a largo plazo que no puede ser solo de infraestructuras, sino de tipo humano y social. La gran riqueza petrolera y las necesidades de desarrollo, combinadas con la falta de transparencia, hacen del Golfo una tierra de oportunidades y contrastes, una región muy tradicional que intenta impulsar cambios lentos y graduales entre incertidumbres y un creciente clamor por los derechos sociales y políticos.

La transformación hacia una economía del conocimiento, con centros de excelencia para la educación, la salud y el deporte, y la asociación con los mejores para construir una marca con inversiones orientadas a la creación de reputación internacional que lo posicione como destino turístico principal, es el gran partido que debe afrontar el golfo Pérsico. Falta ver si será capaz de jugarlo y ganarlo.

A Call to Arm Syria’s Rebels

For Malcolm Rifkind (The New York Times, 09/08/2012). Malcolm Rifkind served as Britain’s defense minister and foreign secretary under Prime Minister John Major.

In September 1991, as violence spread through the Balkans, Yugoslavia’s helpless foreign minister, Budimir Loncar, requested that the United Nations Security Council establish a global arms embargo that would apply to all parties in the conflict. His request remains, to my knowledge, the only example of a government demanding that sanctions be imposed on its own country.

In theory, the move was an act of neutrality designed to contain the violence. In fact, the embargo — which I supported at the time — consolidated the Bosnian Serbs’ overwhelming superiority of arms due to their access to the stockpiles of the Yugoslav National Army. Its effect was to make Bosnian Muslim communities much weaker in the face of the Bosnian Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing, illustrated most tragically by the massacre at Srebrenica.

Today, some 20 years after the outbreak of the Balkans wars, Western policymakers are faced with a similar dilemma — whether the provision of arms to a party in conflict will be used in self defense or to commit atrocities and revenge attacks; whether it will hasten the resolution of a conflict or encourage its prolongation. And we are now making the same mistake in Syria as was made during the Bosnian conflict.

I accept that Western military combat in Syria would be mistaken. Unlike the NATO-supported action in Libya, there is no prospect of Russia ending its veto in the Security Council. Nor has the Arab League called for such action, as it did with the rising against Muammar el-Qaddafi.

This does not mean, however, that the United States and Europe can and should do nothing. It was right to try to pursue a diplomatically brokered political settlement through the United Nations, but this process foundered on President Bashar al-Assad’s continued brutality. With the diplomatic route blocked, and Syria’s rebels managing to strike at the heart of the regime in Damascus and Aleppo, the war has moved into a potentially much bloodier phase, which could draw in some if not all of Syria’s neighbors.

We must now consider a series of extremely grim scenarios: fighting in Lebanon inflaming sectarian tensions in that country; the pilfering of Syria’s chemical weapons either by another state or nonstate actor; the total collapse of Syria and a violent free-for-all in the resulting power vacuum.

In order to prevent these possibilities we must press for unity in the Syrian opposition. Structures that encourage communication and cooperation between rebel factions are necessary, both for their war effort and for the period of transition that will follow Assad’s eventual departure.

The longer war drags on, the more likely a legitimate struggle for self-determination will descend further into a cycle of communal violence, poisoning the possibility of a mutually acceptable political settlement. Without such a settlement, Syrian and regional violence will continue — whether the Ba’athist regime survives or not.

It is not sufficient to hector the rebels to “get their act together.” The Americans and the Europeans need leverage, and for leverage they must provide meaningful incentives. This should come in the form of arms supplies to the Syrian insurgents if they can show real progress toward creating a united opposition. This would require a modification of the European Union’s arms embargo. Unlike the U.N. arms embargo in Bosnia, this decision is not at the mercy of a Russian or Chinese veto.

Supplying arms in a civil war will always be controversial and in the short term would lead to greater fighting and more deaths. But it would also ensure the collapse of the Assad regime in weeks rather than months. We should not assume that high-profile defections such as that of Prime Minister Riyad Hijab spell the imminent collapse of the regime — the core of Syria’s security state remains intact. The longer this war lasts the greater overall carnage there will be.

Arming the Syrian insurgents is not an attractive strategy. Providing arms to be used in combat never is. There would be serious risks. But we can already see that the alternative is far worse. The Syrian people need the tools so that they can finish the job of removing this cruel regime.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Teherán y la "Primavera árabe"

Por Ramin Jahanbegloo, filósofo iraní, es catedrático de Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de Toronto (El País, 06/08/2012). Traducción de María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia.

Un fantasma recorre Oriente Próximo: es el fantasma del cambio democrático. Los poderes que representan las viejas ideas y al Oriente Próximo autoritario han formado una alianza diabólica para deshacerse de este fantasma, pero los vientos del cambio soplan ya por toda la región, y es difícil suponer que van a disiparse en un futuro inmediato.

Durante medio siglo, todo el mundo acusó a los ciudadanos árabes, turcos e iraníes de que no mostraban suficiente interés en conquistar las libertades democráticas ni luchaban verdaderamente para liberarse de sus gobernantes autoritarios. En los últimos tiempos, sin embargo, millones de egipcios, tunecinos, iraníes, yemeníes, sirios y bahreiníes han demostrado que esa acusación no era cierta al llevar a cabo unas movilizaciones cada vez más amplias contra los tiranos. Si los levantamientos en Oriente Próximo culminan con la caída de los regímenes iraní y sirio, sus efectos en la región serán más poderosos que todas las repercusiones que han podido tener las guerras entre árabes e israelíes durante los últimos 60 años.

Muchos comentaristas occidentales han dado a las rebeliones que están recorriendo Oriente Próximo y el Magreb el nombre dePrimavera árabe. Es indudable que el modelo en el que se mira la Primavera árabe es la Primavera de Praga de 1968, el breve intervalo de reformas democráticas que vivió Checoslovaquia antes de que los carros de combate de la Unión Soviética invadieran el país. La verdad es que las protestas que se han extendido por todo Oriente Próximo tienen poco que ver con la Primavera de Praga, aunque, como ocurrió en el caso de los movimientos civiles en el este de Europa, los recientes despertares democráticos en el mundo árabe han vuelto a dejar claro que la sociedad civil puede ayudar a proporcionar el espacio independiente necesario —por utilizar la famosa distinción de Isaiah Berlin— para las libertades “negativas”, más que para las “positivas”. Lo que unió a tunecinos, egipcios e iraníes en sus levantamientos democráticos, así como a los pueblos de Yemen y Siria en la actualidad, fue la voluntad de permanecer libres de toda injerencia y la lucha contra la concentración de poder arbitrario. En todas y cada una de esas revueltas hemos visto, día a día, a jóvenes dispuestos a arriesgar sus vidas para derrocar a un Gobierno corrupto que no podía o no quería crear un futuro libre y próspero para ellos.

En realidad, para ser exactos, si nos fijamos con más detalle en los jóvenes que pusieron en marcha estas demandas democráticas en Oriente Próximo, podemos ver sin lugar a dudas que la Primavera árabe empezó en Irán en junio de 2009. Es decir, la Primavera árabe tuvo un comienzo nada árabe, con el Movimiento Verde iraní y lo que se llamó la Rrevolución del twitter de los jóvenes iraníes. Muchos consideran que el Movimiento Cívico Iraní de esas fechas constituyó un momento crucial en la historia moderna de Irán. Al principio, las revueltas nacieron para protestar por la manipulación de las elecciones presidenciales y la reelección de Mahmud Ahmadineyad, pero pronto se convirtieron en una lucha masiva en favor de las libertades civiles y la expulsión del régimen teocrático de Irán. Las manifestaciones no fueron solo una forma de reaccionar contra unos resultados electorales injustos, sino que tenían sus raíces en años de frustraciones, insatisfacción e ira acumuladas contra el Gobierno represor de la República Islámica. Ahora bien, la gran pregunta que no tiene aún respuesta es: si la Primavera árabe comenzó en Irán, en 2009, ¿por qué ahora les está costando tanto volver a dar a luz un nuevo movimiento democrático?

A la hora de la verdad, lo que diferencia la situación iraní de los casos de Túnez y Egipto es el hecho de que el régimen iraní cuenta con una base ideológica, mientras que, tanto en el régimen de Túnez como en el de Egipto, la ideología era muy débil o incluso inexistente. Ben Ali y Hosni Mubarak, además de ser los auténticos centros de poder, representaban la propia identidad de los regímenes de sus respectivos países, por lo que las protestas tenían un blanco muy claro y preciso.

En Irán, el Líder Supremo, Ali Jamenei, es una figura muy poderosa, pero no es indispensable para el régimen, que es una especie de “oligarquía plural”, con varios actores y centros de toma de decisiones políticas y económicas. También existen otras diferencias. En primer lugar, el régimen iraní es más implacable y sistemático en la represión de sus opositores de lo que jamás lo fueran los regímenes de Ben Ali y Mubarak. En segundo lugar, gran parte de su atractivo internacional procede del hecho de que es una respuesta islámica digna a los regímenes corruptos de la región. Y, por último, la Marea Verde de 2009 en Irán era un movimiento político que no exigía más que reformas democráticas. En Egipto, por el contrario, las protestas no han sido exclusivamente de tipo político, y los ciudadanos que abarrotaban la plaza de Tahrir reclamaban asimismo derechos sociales y económicos, mientras los obreros organizaban huelgas en todo el país para acompañar las protestas. También hubo, tanto en Túnez como en Egipto, un recurso muy explícito al problema de la corrupción en los llamamientos y las movilizaciones, y no así en Irán, a pesar de que el régimen iraní no se queda atrás en ese aspecto. Todos estos elementos hacen pensar que las protestas y revueltas iraníes, aunque forman ya una corriente irreversible, tardarán mucho más en dar fruto y sufrirán muchas más penalidades.

Si nos centramos en lo que sucedió en Egipto y Túnez en el año 2011, podemos decir que las revueltas en esos dos países triunfaron porque en ambos casos las fuerzas armadas tomaron la decisión de no compartir la suerte de sus respectivos dictadores y se negaron a disparar contra la gente. En cambio, el Movimiento Verde estaba muy limitado desde el punto de vista táctico cuando se encontraba frente a frente con la terrible violencia del Estado islámico, y las manifestaciones callejeras acabaron siendo la principal arma del movimiento.

Muchos observadores opinan que el Movimiento Verde perdió su unidad y su impulso debido a las violentas represalias ejercidas por el régimen iraní. Otros dicen que el Movimiento Verde tenía la capacidad y la posibilidad de conseguir lo que deseara y que, si se contuvo y, al final, se quedó sin alcanzar los objetivos, fue por culpa de lo que era su punto más débil: su dirección.

Hoy es imposible hablar de Irán sin mencionar Egipto, Túnez y los demás países musulmanes en los que soplan vientos de cambio. Sin embargo, aunque las demandas de democracia sean las mismas, las vías para alcanzarla serán muy distintas. En Egipto y Túnez, la expulsión de los dictadores y la celebración de elecciones libres fueron las señales de que había llegado el “comienzo de la política”. En Irán, por el contrario, la política no comenzará con el fin de los dictadores, sino que será la propia política la que conduzca a esa meta. Como ya se ha dcho, Egipto fue un sprint, mientras que Irán será una maratón.

La pregunta que queda por responder es: si el sistema político iraní no puede reformarse de manera pacífica y no violenta, a través de las urnas, porque no es capaz de prestar atención a las demandas populares de cambio, ¿qué queda entonces del sueño democrático iraní? Si eso ocurre, tal vez los iraníes tengan que esperar a otra generación para que ese sueño se haga realidad. En cualquier caso, suceda lo que suceda, el futuro de la lucha por la democracia en Irán ejercerá una influencia determinante en el rumbo que seguirá Oriente Próximo durante la segunda década del siglo XXI.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona 

The coming U.N. debacle

By Yossi Klein Halevi, a fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem and a contributing editor at the New Republic (LOS ANGELES TIMES, 20/09/11):

After decades of failed negotiations over a Palestinian state, it is tempting to imagine that the potential vote in the U.N. General Assembly on Palestinian statehood might help finally resolve one of the most vexing problems that the world has inherited from the previous century. And after all, that’s just how a Jewish state was born — by a U.N. General Assembly vote in 1947.

But a U.N. vote that seeks to bypass negotiations and impose a fait accompli on Israel will only undermine a two-state solution. By deepening Israel’s isolation, the vote will reinforce the sense among Israelis that this is not a time for concessions but for resolve.

As polls in recent years show, a majority of Israelis supports a two-state solution. And for good pragmatic reason: Israelis see a Palestinian state as an existential necessity for Israel itself, a means of preserving their country’s Jewish majority and democratic identity.

But that same majority also perceives a Palestinian state as a potential existential threat. Even primitive missiles launched from the West Bank hills against greater Tel Aviv would end normal life here. And should Israel then be forced to send its soldiers back into the West Bank, it would likely find itself judged — perhaps literally — in the court of world opinion.

That, after all, is what happened when Israel invaded the Gaza Strip in 2009, even though Israel had withdrawn from Gaza four years earlier, only to be hit by thousands of rockets over its international border.

A Palestinian state, then, could create an untenable choice for Israel: learn to live with terror as a daily reality, or defend yourself and become a pariah.

In endorsing an imposed solution, the General Assembly would be telling Israelis that their security concerns are irrelevant. It is, in other words, far more important to the U.N. to create Arab state No. 22 than it is to ensure the safety of the lone Jewish state.

With its disdain for Israel, the U.N. has invalidated itself as a forum in which to try to heal the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel isn’t just condemned by the world body more than any other country; the Jewish state is condemned more often than all other countries combined. According to U.N. Watch in Geneva, the U.N.’s Human Rights Council has adopted, since its founding in 2006, about 70 resolutions condemning specific countries, 40 of which have been against Israel. In the General Assembly, about 20 anti-Israel resolutions are adopted each year, as opposed to five or six against other countries. That is not mere hostility but pathological obsession.

The vote to recognize Palestine will almost certainly increase anti-Israel violence in the region. It will also likely encourage the international boycott-Israel movement, which uniquely ostracizes the Jewish state. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas has said that upgraded Palestinian status at the U.N. would “pave the way” to press for legal sanctions against Israel. The likely result would be to turn any Israeli act of war, even in self-defense, into a war crime.

Statehood is a responsibility to be earned. And so far the Palestinian national movement has hardly proved its willingness to live in peace beside Israel. Palestinian schools and media — those of Fatah as well as of Hamas — routinely portray Israel as an artificial and temporary creation, without any rootedness in the land. All of Jewish history — from the ancient temple in Jerusalem to the Holocaust — is dismissed as a lie. No Palestinian leader has told his people — as Israeli prime ministers since Yitzhak Rabin have told their people — that the land must be shared by two nations. Instead, Palestinian leaders have consistently told their people that the goal is a state on all the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and they encourage their people to dream of a Middle East without Israel.

The U.N. vote comes at a time when Israelis are feeling increasingly besieged. In the last year, Israel’s closest regional ally, Turkey, has turned outright hostile; Turkey’s Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, last week threatened to dispatch warships against Israel. The peace with Egypt is unraveling: Two weeks ago, as a mob ransacked Israel’s embassy in Cairo, Egyptian leaders refused to take desperate calls from their Israeli counterparts and dispatched commandos to rescue Israeli personnel only after American intervention. Israel evacuated its embassy in Amman, Jordan, over the weekend to avert a similar situation.

Meanwhile, terrorist enclaves on Israel’s borders — Hezbollah in the north, Hamas in the south — aim tens of thousands of missiles at Israeli cities. And the Iranian regime, whose declared goal is the destruction of Israel, is moving ever closer to nuclear capability.

For many Israelis the sense of threat recalls May 1967, when Arab leaders vowing to destroy the Jewish state massed their armies on its borders. And while the international community remembers Israel’s stunning victory against those forces in June 1967, Israelis recall the terrible isolation of the weeks before, when even Israel’s friends offered little assistance.

Israel tends to take risks for peace when it believes the chance for peace is credible and when it senses a fair international climate. Israel withdrew from the Sinai desert — which is three times the size of Israel and which provided it with strategic protection — because Egyptian President Anwar Sadat convinced the Israeli public he was serious about peace. And when Eastern European and many Third World countries established diplomatic relations with Israel following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Israel responded with an overture to the Palestine Liberation Organization that became the Oslo process.

But when the international community treats the Jewish state with contempt, Israelis tend to reciprocate. The result is a stiffening of hard-line attitudes.

In large measure, then, the future of a Palestinian state will be determined by whether Israelis perceive it more as existential necessity or as existential threat, and whether they feel the international community is receptive to their security concerns.

In one sense the U.N. vote is a useful reminder of the origins of the conflict. In 1947 the General Assembly voted for partition; it didn’t call for creating only a Jewish state but a Palestinian state as well. The Arab world rejected partition and tried to destroy Israel.

That rejection remains the core of the conflict. However problematic, settlements are not the main obstacle to an agreement. Both former Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert offered to uproot dozens of settlements and concentrate the rest in “blocs” along the border to enable Palestinian territorial contiguity. Palestinian leaders dismissed those offers.

In endorsing a diplomatic process that ignores Israel, the U.N. would, in effect, affirm the Arab world’s attempt to erase Israel’s legitimacy. And by encouraging Israeli despair, it could help turn Palestine into a permanent virtual state.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Ten Reasons for a European ‘Yes’

By Martti Ahtisaari, a former president of Finland, U.N. mediator and the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 and Javier Solana, a distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution who served as secretary general of NATO and E.U. high representative for common foreign and security policy. Both men are members of the board of the European Council on Foreign Relations (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 17/09/11):

It is not often that Europe has the chance to play a pivotal role on the world stage. But as the Palestinians push for recognition as a state at the United Nations later this month, the European Union is finding itself courted by each side, and therefore more influential on the Middle East process than at any time since the Oslo Accords.

As ever, the biggest challenge facing the E.U.’s 27 member states is presenting a unified front. There are 10 compelling reasons for them to coalesce around a “yes” vote and keep the two-state approach to Middle East peace alive.

The critical vote is likely to be in the General Assembly, on a resolution to upgrade the Palestinians’ status from observer to non-member state. The Palestinians are likely to get a majority, but what matters more than the outcome of the vote is its size and composition.

The Israeli government is lobbying hard for a “no,” and the P.L.O., unable to significantly shape realities on the ground, hopes to at least show some diplomatic traction for its continued faith in the two-state approach. Europeans find themselves in the unusual position of being the key prize in this tussle.

The first reason why the E.U. 27 should vote “yes” is that the U.N. resolution is an attempt to keep the two-state solution alive. This solution is under attack from the steady expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s belief that the conflict should now be accepted as “insoluble.” As a result this vote is not a meaningless distraction, but a reaffirmation that the peace process is meaningful.

The second reason for a European “yes” is that the Europeans have already invested hugely in the two-state solution that is under scrutiny, including the annual €1 billion aid to help build a functioning Palestinian state. Again, a “yes” is a reaffirmation that the project is worthwhile and can succeed.

The third reason for a “yes” is simply to respond positively to Mahmoud Abbas’ state-building achievements. Failing to vote “yes” would be to respond to demands for state-building by refusing to formally acknowledge where they have got to.

The fourth reason is about the Arab Spring. Anything other than a “yes” would expose Europeans to charges of double standards from both post-revolutionary governments and conservative Arab regimes (for different reasons) for failing to support rights for Palestinians while advocating them elsewhere.

Usefully, a “yes” also aligns European interests with European values (the fifth reason), as it resets regional relationships. Interests — including preventing jihadist terrorism, containing Iran, security energy supplies and retaining markets for our exports — would all be damaged by perceived hypocrisy on the Israel/Palestinian conflict.

Despite concerns from Atlanticists that a “yes” will damage relations with the United States, arguably it could also be in Washington’s interests (the sixth reason). The U.S. is unable to vote “yes” for evident domestic reasons, but the E.U. 27 doing so would strengthen America’s hand when dealing with Israel. In the words of William Hague, a healthy trans-Atlantic relationship would be solid rather than slavish.

The seventh and eighth reasons concern Israel. The Israelis’ objections to the vote — that it is unilateral and violates previous agreements — do not hold water, and are no reason for Europe not to vote “yes.” Although the vote would open up negotiating options for Palestine that are currently closed, overall it might even help Israel. Moves toward recognition of Palestinian statehood within 1967 borders would reinforce the legitimacy of Israel’s own existence.

Despite Israeli fears, it would not necessarily open an easier path for Palestinian recourse to the International Criminal Court, and might give Europe a position from which it could pursue a quiet understanding with the Palestinians that they would not pursue I.C.C. jurisdiction for a significant period, drawing the sting from this troubling issue.

The ninth reason for a European “yes” is that it would not make Palestinian violence more likely. Indeed, a combination of perceived failure and the influence of the Arab Spring could touch off a “third intifada.” Squeezed between Israel and the invigorating sight of televised uprisings, the Palestinian authorities need a sign of progress if they are to prevent frustrations turning to violence. European endorsement of their statehood would be a powerful public signal that progress is possible.

Finally, a “yes” at the U.N. does not entail bilateral recognition of Palestine. The vote is for upgrading representation at the U.N., and only individual states can bestow recognition on Palestine.

There is of course an 11th reason for a unified European “yes” vote. The world already has enough examples of European inability to play an effective international role. Optimists will hope that Europeans will, this time, surprise us all by doing the right thing and securing themselves a much-needed diplomatic success in the process.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

After the U.N. Vote on Palestine

By Jimmy Carter, 39th president of the United States, founder of the Carter Center, which works to advance peace and health worldwide (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14/09/11):

In September 1978, Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin signed the Camp David Accords, following four Arab-Israeli wars in which Egypt had provided the overwhelming military force that threatened the existence of Israel.

The Egyptian Parliament and the Israeli Knesset overwhelmingly approved the agreement, which called for honoring all aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. One of its key provisions was the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.” The accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli military and political forces from the occupied territories and the granting of “full autonomy” to the Palestinians.

Six months later, a peace treaty between the two nations was adopted, which provided for Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai, Israel’s use of the Suez Canal and full diplomatic relations.

Since then, the terms of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel have prevailed, but the key provisions of the Camp David Accords have been ignored. Following the death of Sadat, President Hosni Mubarak did not press for Palestinian rights, though most of the Egyptian people have continued to insist that Israel honor these commitments. The primary subject of concern is the continued occupation by Israel of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the building of Israeli settlements on confiscated Palestinian land.

President Barack Obama acknowledged the centrality of this issue in a major speech in Cairo in March 2009, when he called for a freeze on all settlement activity. Later, in May 2009, President Obama declared that the prevailing borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — adjusted to account for some Israeli settlements near Jerusalem — should be the basis of a peace agreement.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected both proposals, continued building settlements, and raised unacceptable new demands for a permanent military presence in the Jordan River valley and recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state” (about 25 percent of Israeli citizens are non-Jewish).

The U.S. has basically withdrawn from active participation in the peace process. The Palestinians and other Arabs have interpreted U.S. policy as acquiescing on the occupation and biased against them.

Declaring that they are left with no alternative, Palestinians plan to request recognition of a Palestinian state later this month in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly. In Egypt, militants have overrun the Israeli embassy and forced the evacuation of the ambassador.

With the reasonable assumptions that Palestinian statehood is widely recognized despite a U.S. veto in the Security Council, what are the options for the future?

With leadership from Europe, there will be an opportunity for the United States and other members of the International Quartet (Russia, the European Union and the United Nations) to put forward a comprehensive peace proposal based on the fully compatible U.S. official policy, previous U.N. resolutions and the Quartet’s previous demands. There is little doubt that the Arab Peace Proposal could be modified to comply.

This can be followed by the full engagement of the United States and/or the United Nations in a mediation effort with direct or indirect talks — whichever is more effective — between Israel and the Palestinians. Subsequently, the same approach can be taken to resolve the issue of the Golan Heights with Syria.

The Palestinians will have to refrain from violence, accept Israel’s right to exist in peace within the 1967 borders (modified through negotiations with land swaps), a long-term presence of either U.N. or NATO peacekeeping forces within Palestine, and the right of return of its people to its own lands (with perhaps a token number to Israel). Israelis would, in the process, accept the same borders and peacekeeping presence.

The result can lead to peace for Israel and all its neighbors. The United States would regain its leadership role in the region, based on its commitment to freedom, democracy and justice, and a major cause of widespread animosity toward America within the Arab world would be eliminated.

The alternative to this new international effort will be an expansion of hopelessness, animosity, and probable violence.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

An Israeli Case for a Palestinian State

By Yossi Alpher, co-editor of bitterlemons.net. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12/09/11):

Israelis and Palestinians need a new peace paradigm. The true significance of the Palestinian bid for United Nations recognition of a Palestinian state is that final-status talks based on the Oslo accords have run their course and failed. By placing future Israeli-Palestinian contacts on a state-to-state basis, U.N. recognition could help lay the foundation for that paradigm.

The conventional wisdom is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigent behavior has driven the Palestinians to take the international track. But that hardly offers a complete explanation for this revolution in the Palestinian approach.

More significantly, P.L.O. Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’ experience in direct negotiations with Ehud Olmert, then Israel’s prime minister, in 2008 — following on the first final-status failure in 2000 at Camp David between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat — was an eye-opener for the Palestinian leader.

He confronted the most far-reaching Israeli peace proposal yet offered concerning refugees and holy places, yet he rejected it because it was still far from his and his constituents’ core demands on these issues.

That made it clear that the Oslo formula of linking all final-status issues in an agreement would continue to founder on these two issues. The disputes that arise from 1967 — territory, statehood, security — have proven relatively amenable to agreement. But the differences grounded in both sides’ deeper historical narratives are the real reason for 18 years of failed efforts.

As Israelis understand it, the Palestinian demand that Israel recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return requires a tacit acknowledgement that the state of Israel was “born in sin” in 1948. And the Palestinian assertion that “there never was a temple on the Temple Mount,” and that therefore Israel has no inherent rights there, is perceived as a denial of Israel’s national and historical roots.

No Israeli leader will acquiesce in these Palestinian positions, and no bridging formula has proven workable. These negotiating gaps are, as Abbas himself acknowledged in 2009, “too wide.”

Thus Abbas has turned to the United Nations not only because the Palestinian state-building enterprise in the West Bank has proved successful, but also because it is clear that Oslo-based final-status negotiations, even if they reconvene, cannot succeed in ending all claims. In this sense, it is Abbas’ intransigence on a full final status package, no less than Netanyahu’s, that has brought us to the United Nations.

Yet here the two part company: Abbas appears genuinely to want progress toward a viable two-state solution, while Netanyahu’s ideology and the composition of his coalition signal intransigence.

Abbas is leading the Palestinians to the United Nations in the full knowledge that there he will be making the substantive concessions that his principles and his constituents do not allow him to make in bilateral talks.

At the United Nations — in contrast to bilateral negotiations — Abbas is prepared to accept international determination of the 1967 borders and a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem as the defining parameters of a Palestinian state, with the refugees and holy places left to further negotiations.

Even if Israel and Palestine subsequently fail to agree on these “deal-breakers,” with their central role in each side’s national narrative, we still emerge from the United Nations with a two-state reality and a far more manageable conflict.

For all its pitfalls and problems, Abbas is offering Israel a very attractive trade-off at the United Nations in return for the 1967 lines and a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. When he squares off against an Israeli leader as president of the territorially defined state of Palestine, rather than as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization with its roots in the refugee issue, the paradigm will have changed.

This reality explains the futility of all the American and European attempts to get the two parties back to the Oslo-based negotiating table. The Oslo final-status paradigm has exhausted its usefulness. Better to adopt the state-to-state paradigm while Oslo autonomy still offers a modicum of stability on the ground.

Ideally, the Palestinian request for U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state can be leveraged into a two-state agreement that serves Israel’s vital needs, as well as those of the Palestinians.

If that doesn’t work, the primary international challenge of the months following the U.N. drama will be to forge a new post-Oslo state-to-state paradigm, then deliver it to the two parties.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Veto a State, Lose an Ally

By Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former director of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence services, a former Saudi ambassador to the United States and chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12/09/11):

The United States must support the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations this month or risk losing the little credibility it has in the Arab world. If it does not, American influence will decline further, Israeli security will be undermined and Iran will be empowered, increasing the chances of another war in the region.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia would no longer be able to cooperate with America in the same way it historically has. With most of the Arab world in upheaval, the “special relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the United States would increasingly be seen as toxic by the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, who demand justice for the Palestinian people.

Saudi leaders would be forced by domestic and regional pressures to adopt a far more independent and assertive foreign policy. Like our recent military support for Bahrain’s monarchy, which America opposed, Saudi Arabia would pursue other policies at odds with those of the United States, including opposing the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq and refusing to open an embassy there despite American pressure to do so. The Saudi government might part ways with Washington in Afghanistan and Yemen as well.

The Palestinian people deserve statehood and all that it entails: official recognition, endorsement by international organizations, the ability to deal with Israel on more equal footing and the opportunity to live in peace and security.

Israel should see the Palestinian bid for statehood not as a threat, but as a chance to return to the negotiating table and prevent further conflict. Recent polls show that up to 70 percent of Palestinians say they believe there will be a new intifada if the deadlock is not broken shortly; this should encourage Israel to seek peace with the moderate Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas.

The Obama administration has had ample opportunities to lead Israelis and Palestinians into bilateral peace talks, but American policy makers have unfortunately been more preoccupied with a deteriorating domestic economy and a paralyzed political scene than with finding a workable solution to this epic injustice. Because Washington has offered no viable new proposals, the least it can do is step aside and not hinder Saudi, European and moderate Arab efforts to advance Palestinian rights at the United Nations.

Even Israeli officials have recently admitted privately to their European counterparts that only Saudi Arabia will be able to give the Palestinians the required religious, political and financial legitimacy they need to complete a deal with Israel. Saudi Arabia had earmarked over $2.5 billion in aid to the Palestinian Authority since June 2009, making it by far the largest single supporter of the Palestinian cause. But this money will not do much good until Palestinians are granted their fundamental rights.

The 2002 Arab Peace Plan must be the starting point for negotiations; a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders is the only realistic foundation on which to restart talks, seeing as how the Oslo Peace Process has proved fruitless.

The Palestinian statehood initiative is a chance to replace Oslo with a new paradigm based on state-to-state negotiations — a win-win proposition that makes the conflict more manageable and lays the groundwork for a lasting solution.

The only losers in this scenario would be Syria and Iran, pariah states that have worked tirelessly — through their support of Hamas and Hezbollah — to undermine the peace process. Saudi Arabia recently played a leading role in isolating Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal government by demanding an end to the killing of protesters and recalling the Saudi ambassador from Damascus. The impending fall of Mr. Assad’s barbarous regime provides a rare strategic opportunity to weaken Iran. Without this vital ally, Tehran will find it more difficult to foment discord in the Arab world.

Today, there is a chance for the United States and Saudi Arabia to contain Iran and prevent it from destabilizing the region. But this opportunity will be squandered if the Obama administration’s actions at the United Nations force a deepening split between our two countries.

Although Saudi Arabia is willing and able to chart a new and divergent course if America fails to act justly with regard to Palestine, the Middle East would be far better served by continuing cooperation and good will between these longstanding allies.

American support for Palestinian statehood is therefore crucial, and a veto will have profound negative consequences. In addition to causing substantial damage to American-Saudi relations and provoking uproar among Muslims worldwide, the United States would further undermine its relations with the Muslim world, empower Iran and threaten regional stability. Let us hope that the United States chooses the path of justice and peace.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Palestina-Israel: nueva posibilidad

Por Pere Vilanova, catedrático de Ciencia Política de la UB (LA VANGUARDIA, 29/08/11):

En verano hay noticias que suelen pasar desapercibidas, entre tantas páginas llenas de serpientes de verano, pero esta tuvo su importancia. A finales de julio, diversos medios publicaron un interesante artículo de Joseph, Yossi, Alpher, analista israelí de prestigio, que fue director del importante Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies de la Universidad de Tel-Aviv, y antes, dirigente (alto) del Mosad. En ese artículo, Alpher aboga explícitamente a favor del reconocimiento del Estado palestino. Esto no es nuevo, muchos dirigentes israelís llevan años haciéndolo. Pero en este caso, el dato adicional es que Alpher propone que en septiembre, en la sesión plenaria de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, España y otros países europeos que el autor califica de «importantes», voten a favor de la propuesta palestina de crear dicho Estado, que parece tener el aval de unos 120 estados miembros. Añade Alpher que es decisivo ese voto, precisamente porque Estados Unidos no está ni preparado ni dispuesto para ello.

Por supuesto, todo el mundo sabe que el voto en la Asamblea General no es jurídicamente vinculante, y que en todo caso la iniciativa sería tumbada por el veto de Estados Unidos cuando llegase al Consejo de Seguridad.

Pero no basta con tener la llave jurídica para vetar una y otra vez la existencia de un Estado palestino, porque se va a crear una situación política insostenible para la Administración de Obama. Y como señala Alpher, con el (largo) proceso electoral norteamericano a las puertas del 2012, el margen de Obama es estrecho. Precisamente por esto, a mediados de agosto, y en una enésima provocación adicional, el Gobierno de Netanyahu ha aprobado la construcción de casi 3.000 viviendas adicionales en asentamientos ilegales tanto en Jerusalén como en Cisjordania.

Se puede observar fácilmente que la situación es compleja (como siempre, pero un poco más) y a la vez ofrece una ventana de oportunidad: la resonancia de un voto masivo favorable en la Asamblea General sería considerable.

¿Por qué pide Alpher (y a través suyo, una parte importante del establishment israelí) un voto audaz de España y otros países europeos? Porque hay que salir del estancamiento del conflicto de los últimos diez años. Estamos en el 2011, muy cerca del décimo aniversario del 11-S, se cumple una década del estallido de la segunda Intifada (aunque de hecho empezó en septiembre del 2000), que enterró el proceso de paz de Oslo-Washington, única negociación efectiva y real entre Israel y la OLP en toda su historia compartida. En efecto, en esta década, además del dramático reguero de muerte y destrucción, han pasado muchas cosas, y casi todas (no todas) malas. Pero, sobre todo, no hay que olvidar el rosario de fracasos de la llamada comunidad internacional con relación al conflicto. Noviembre de 2007, la pomposa Conferencia de Annápolis, en la que George W. Bush convocó -Condoleezza Rice ejerciendo de maestra de ceremonias- a Mahmud Abás, Ehud Olmert, Rusia, China, la Unión Europea, la Liga Árabe y Naciones Unidas. Mucha gente en la cocina para recordar que el objetivo final era la solución de dos estados, pero con pocos compromisos concretos. Mientras, Olmert siguió construyendo asentamientos y finalizando su muro de separación-segregación unilateral. Efectividad de Annápolis, cero. ¿Y antes? Bueno, siempre nos quedará el inolvidable cuarteto para Oriente Medio, creado en el 2002 supuestamente a iniciativa de José María Aznar (pero el interesado se prodiga poco), y cuyo alto representante es desde hace cinco años Tony Blair. ¿Y antes? Ah, tenemos la hoja de ruta del 2004, dibujada por el Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos, y que proponía que en diciembre del 2005 hubiera… ¡un Estado palestino! Eso sí, con tres conferencias internacionales de por medio que no se han llegado ni a convocar, mientras que el total de colonos israelís en los territorios ocupados pasó de 558.988 en 2005 a 585.800 en 2007. Por hacer la lista más completa, hay que recordar el plan de paz conocido como Acuerdos de Ginebra, de 2003-2004, que está tan lleno de buena voluntad y de audacia política, como de desconexión del proceso político real; el plan de paz de la Liga Árabe, auspiciado por Arabia Saudí (sin objeciones por parte de Washington, sabiendo que el plan no saldría en ningún caso), que proponía en el 2002 (en plena fase inicial, la más violenta, de la segunda Intifada) la fórmula clásica de dos estados, retorno de Israel a la frontera de 1967, Jerusalén capital de ambos estados, etcétera.

Añadan las elecciones palestinas de 2005 y 2006, exigidas por la misma comunidad internacional, que luego rechazó las del 2006 porque las ganó Hamás, y aún se está a la espera de que alguien en la Unión Europea diga algo al respecto (su actual alta representante o quizá su predecesor en el cargo).

En fin, ha habido de todo, como pueden ver. Frente a esta situación, España tiene dos posibilidades en septiembre: votar en conciencia o bien escudarse tras «la búsqueda de una posición de consenso de la UE» para abstenerse y cubrirse de ridículo. El consenso de la UE en esta materia ni está ni se le espera…

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

1967-2011 : les Palestiniens n’attendront pas quarante années de plus

Par Saeb Erakat, membre du Comité exécutif de l’OLP et négociateur palestinien. Traduit de l’anglais par Julie Marcot (LE MONDE, 07/06/11):

S’exprimant le 24 mai devant le Congrès américain, le premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou a présenté sa “vision de la paix” pour Israéliens et Palestiniens. Il a en particulier décrit la forme que devrait prendre, selon lui, un Etat palestinien : ses frontières seraient déterminées en fonction des préoccupations d’Israël pour sa sécurité et ne reprendraient pas les lignes de 1967, pourtant reconnues par la communauté internationale ; aucune partie de Jérusalem ne pourrait accueillir sa capitale ; il devrait accepter la présence de troupes étrangères sur son sol. Quant aux réfugiés palestiniens expulsés par l’Etat hébreu, il n’y aurait pour eux ni droit au retour ni réparations.

Cette vision de Netanyahou, visiblement troublée par la myopie, ne marque rien d’autre que l’apogée de sa politique coloniale et colonisatrice. Ce n’est pas une paix, c’est l’apartheid. Ce n’est pas un Etat souverain pour les Palestiniens, c’est la perpétuation déguisée de l’occupation militaire israélienne.

Selon Netanyahou, les frontières de 1967 sont “indéfendables”. Il ne comprend manifestement pas qu’Israël n’aura jamais de frontières défendables tant qu’elle exercera sa domination sur les Palestiniens et sur leurs terres. Ce que les Palestiniens offrent à Israël depuis désormais plus de dix ans, c’est non seulement un accord de paix bilatéral qui mette fin à toutes les revendications, mais aussi une paix régionale globale entre l’Etat hébreu et cinquante-sept autres Etats telle que l’a proposée l’Initiative de paix arabe de 2002 et telle que la soutient l’Organisation de la conférence islamique. Non seulement nous tendons la main à Israël pour que prenne fin le conflit israélo-palestinien, mais nous mettons aussi sur la table la paix et la normalisation des relations entre Israël et ses voisins. En mettant un terme à l’injustice historique infligée au peuple palestinien, Israël obtiendrait enfin cette sécurité qu’elle réclame depuis si longtemps.

Les frontières de 1967 ne constituent pas quelque “condition préalable palestinienne”, ni un nouveau paramètre imaginé par le gouvernement Obama. Les lignes de 1967 constituent les frontières internationalement reconnues entre Israël et le territoire palestinien occupé. Elles reprennent également le compromis palestinien historique de 1988, par lequel l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) a reconnu Israël sur 78 % de la Palestine historique.

Céder ainsi la part du lion de notre patrimoine au nom d’une paix durable était un acte solennel témoignant de la volonté de mettre fin à des décennies de conflit et de sang versé entre Israéliens et Palestiniens. Pourtant, alors que le processus de paix est en cours depuis plus de 20 ans, alors que des milliers de personnes sont mortes ou ont été mutilées, alors que la perpétuation de ce conflit crée d’indescriptibles souffrances, Israël continue de rejeter obstinément la paix.

Les gouvernements israéliens successifs ont employé une débauche de moyens pour modifier le statu quo du territoire palestinien occupé et effacer les frontières de 1967. Au cours des quarante-quatre dernières années, Israël a consacré plus de 17 milliards de dollars à la construction de colonies. Cette entreprise néocolonialiste – un crime de guerre en vertu des conventions de Genève – conduit d’aucuns à se demander si la solution à deux Etats reste envisageable.

En tant que premier négociateur palestinien, j’ai participé à la plupart des négociations avec Israël. J’étais l’un des premiers Palestiniens arrivés à la conférence de paix de Madrid, où il nous fut assuré par George Bush, alors président des Etats-Unis, que nos discussions avec les Israéliens auraient pour cadre la résolution 242 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, autrement dit, l’idée que la paix israélo-palestinienne passait par le retrait d’Israël au niveau des frontières de 1967. A l’époque, en 1991, environ 200 000 colons israéliens résidaient illégalement sur le territoire palestinien occupé. Vingt ans plus tard, ils sont presque trois fois plus nombreux. Alors que l’une des principales motivations ayant poussé l’OLP à signer les accords d’Oslo était précisément de s’assurer qu’il n’y aurait plus de velléité de revenir sur le statu quo du territoire palestinien occupé, la colonisation par Israël de terres palestiniennes s’est poursuivie sans répit. La “feuille de route” adoptée par le Quartet [en 2003] appelait au gel de la colonisation israélienne et au démantèlement des colonies de peuplement, mais Israël a refusé de s’y plier. Si Israël n’a pas jugé bon de respecter nos accords et arrangements précédents, quelle légitimité accorder à de nouvelles négociations avec les Israéliens ?

Avec son discours devant le Congrès américain, Netanyahou a achevé d’enterrer le processus de paix. Le premier ministre israélien a ainsi prouvé au monde qu’il n’est pas un homme de paix. Il n’a manifesté de respect ni pour le droit international, ni pour les accords passés. Il a rejeté le principe le plus fondamental du processus de paix : l’échange de territoires contre la paix.

Nous refusons de laisser notre Etat de Palestine se faire ensevelir sous quarante années supplémentaires d’expansion des colonies israéliennes. Nous, Palestiniens, allons continuer d’œuvrer pour la reconnaissance de notre Etat dans les frontières de 1967. Nous allons lancer la procédure de demande d’adhésion aux Nations unies et demander à l’Assemblée générale de soutenir notre appel pacifique à la concrétisation de nos aspirations nationales. En l’absence de négociations sérieuses, en l’absence de mandat clair et puisque rien de ce qui a été conclu par le passé n’est appliqué, nous n’avons pas d’autre option.

Notre peuple (dix millions d’individus dans le monde) vit depuis trop longtemps sous l’occupation ou en exil. Nous avons droit à notre liberté, nous avons droit à la justice, nous avons le droit de vivre en paix et en sécurité sur nos terres historiques. Et en dépit de tous les efforts de Netanyahou, nous sommes convaincus que notre adhésion aux Nations unies montrera que dans le monde entier, d’autres pays souhaitent eux aussi que nous jouissions de ces droits fondamentaux.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Vers la proclamation de l’Etat palestinien

Par Didier Billion, Rédacteur en chef de La revue internationale et stratégique, IRIS (LE MONDE, 06/06/11):

Le 19 mai dernier, le président Obama a créé une certaine surprise en se prononçant pour la création d’un Etat palestinien dans les frontières de 1967, idée qu’il avait déjà esquissée en septembre 2009 devant l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU, avec “des échanges [de territoires] sur lesquels les deux parties seraient d’accord”. Les Palestiniens, pour leur part, devraient alors reconnaître Israël comme un Etat juif et accepter un statut d’Etat démilitarisé pour la Palestine. Dans le même discours, Barack Obama critiquait brutalement le projet des Palestiniens de proclamer leur Etat lors de la prochaine Assemblée générale de l’ONU en stigmatisant des actions symboliques qui ont pour but d’“isoler Israël aux Nations unies”.

Moins d’une heure et demi après ce discours, le premier ministre israélien faisait savoir dans un communiqué que “les frontières de 1967 sont indéfendables”. Position réaffirmée avec force lors de son entretien avec le président états-unien à Washington deux jours plus tard. Mais le pire était à venir, et le discours prononcé par Benyamin Nétanyahou devant le Congrès, le 24 mai, fut déplorable et consternant parce qu’il confirmait une fois de plus l’autisme politique dont les dirigeants israéliens font preuve. En effet le Premier ministre fermait systématiquement toute possibilité de reprendre de véritables négociations avec les Palestiniens. Maniant le mensonge et la mauvaise foi, il utilisait des arguties éculées. Ainsi, il condamnait avec violence l’accord de réconciliation inter-palestinien entre le Fatah et le Hamas, signé au Caire le 4 mai, et dénonçait de façon pavlovienne l’alliance avec une organisation terroriste, qualifiée d’Al-Qaïda palestinienne ! Mais ce qu’oubliait de dire Benyamin Nétanyahou c’est que l’accord entre les deux organisations palestiniennes prévoit la mise en place d’un gouvernement de techniciens au sein duquel ne siègera aucun parti, que le même accord ne s’oppose pas à la perspective de pourparlers que pourrait mener le président Mahmoud Abbas et qu’un hypothétique accord de paix pourrait ainsi engager la totalité des Palestiniens, donc aussi le Hamas.

Ce discours de fermeture absolue était prononcé devant un Congrès états-unien enthousiaste qui ne cessait de l’interrompre par des applaudissements frénétiques et vingt-six standing ovations. Spectacle lamentable de parlementaires – dont les préoccupations de politique intérieure ne sont certes pas absentes – qui soutiennent l’extrémisme du gouvernement israélien sans comprendre que cette politique mène l’Etat hébreu, plus que jamais isolé sur la scène internationale, au bord de l’abîme. Le discours israélien s’explique aussi par l’obsession de faire échouer le projet de proclamation de l’Etat palestinien au mois de septembre 2011.

Pourtant, au vu des blocages politiques, dont le discours de Nétanyahou est l’expression la plus insupportable, les Palestiniens n’ont d’autre choix que de poursuivre ce combat. Paradoxalement ce sont eux qui déterminent le temps diplomatique, ce qui effraie les Israéliens, mais aussi l’administration Obama. Cette dernière, si elle ne prend pas d’initiatives concrètes et se contente des discours sans effet de son président, est piégée. En effet, Barack Obama agite le chiffon rouge de l’utilisation de son veto au Conseil de sécurité alors que la création d’un Etat palestinien fait partie de la rhétorique présidentielle. Il prend certes soin d’expliquer sans cesse que la proclamation d’un Etat palestinien doit être la conséquence d’un processus de négociations mais, comme nous l’avons rappelé, la partie israélienne y est absolument opposée. La Maison Blanche est-elle alors disposée à faire des pressions sur son allié israélien ? Rien n’est moins sûr. On l’a malheureusement constaté lors du Congrès de l’AIPAC le 22 mai au cours duquel Obama n’a eu de cesse d’expliquer que son discours prononcé trois jours plus tôt avait été victime de “représentations fausses”, comme s’il était lui-même surpris de son propre courage.

Il existe un autre aspect du piège dans lequel se trouve Washington. Dans l’hypothèse où Barack Obama s’opposerait à la reconnaissance de l’Etat palestinien au mois de septembre, il perdrait la bataille de la reconnexion de son pays avec le monde arabo-musulman qu’il tente de mener actuellement en accompagnant l’onde de choc qui parcourt la région. Quadrature du cercle dont le président Obama va avoir quelques difficultés à trouver la solution. En outre, il ne doit pas s’attendre à ce que le président Abbas abandonne sa stratégie onusienne pour la simple et bonne raison qu’il n’en pas d’autre.

Certes personne ne saurait croire que la seule proclamation d’un Etat palestinien dans les frontières de 1967 résoudrait comme par enchantement les problèmes concrets, quotidiens, de l’édification d’un Etat mais elle modifierait la donne en termes de droit international. Ainsi les colonies israéliennes seraient zones d’occupation d’un Etat souverain, ce qui ouvrirait par exemple la possibilité de recours auprès de la Cour internationale de justice internationale et internationaliserait le conflit.

Nous savons que le gouvernement israélien ne restera pas sans réagir. Sa décision d’autoriser la construction de 1520 nouveaux logements dans la partie orientale de Jérusalem le jour même du discours d’Obama et le gel durant deux semaines du transfert des taxes et des droits de douane qui sont dus à l’Autorité palestinienne fournit un avant-goût des mesures de rétorsion que l’Etat hébreu est capable de prendre.

Une fois de plus se pose la question de la détermination de ladite communauté internationale à faire appliquer le droit international et de la résolution du président Obama de ne plus se contenter de discours, certes ciselés et convaincants, pour enfin passer à des initiatives concrètes visant à effectuer des pressions effectives sur Israël. On le voit, les semaines et les mois à venir seront déterminants pour le peuple palestinien.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Israël-Palestine : toujours l’impasse

Michel Tatu, chronique du 30 mai 2011 pour la FRS (LE MONDE, 02/06/11):

Un nouveau discours “programmatique” de Barack Obama sur le conflit israélo-palestinien et les relations avec le monde arabe, le 19 mai, suivi d’une nouvelle visite de Benyamin Netanyahou aux Etats-Unis, avec les traditionnelles interventions devant l’association juive Aipac et les deux chambres du Congrès américain: tout semblait prêt, dans la foulée des révolutions arabes et après l’élimination de Ben Laden, pour une relance du “processus de paix” en Palestine. Il n’en a rien été. Bien au contraire, les positions sont plus figées que jamais, et même durcies.

C’est surtout le cas du côté israélien, où l’on a aussitôt rejeté les timides demandes du président américain. Celui-ci ne s’était guère aventuré en réclamant un accord “sur la base des frontières de 1967″ avec des échanges librement consentis de territoires : c’est ce qui a toujours été reconnu comme le cadre légal d’un accord de paix par les principaux gouvernements de la planète et les résolutions onusiennes depuis plus de 40 ans, et même admis peu ou prou par les gouvernements israéliens successifs. Mais cela ne convient plus à Benyamin Netanyahou, pour qui ces frontières ne sont “pas défendables” : même la démilitarisation du futur Etat palestinien – avec laquelle Washington est d’accord – n’y changera rien, pas plus que l’offre renouvelée d’une aide militaire américaine accrue. Le premier ministre israélien avait déjà créé la surprise l’an dernier en exigeant de ses partenaires la reconnaissance d’Israël comme un “Etat juif” – un fait tacitement admis jusqu’ici, mais dont la reconnaissance officielle souleve de nouveaux problèmes d’ordre juridique, religieux, ethnique, etc. Bref, tout se passe comme si M. Netanyahou posait à chaque étape de nouvelles conditions à la poursuite des négociations. Sans parler de la colonisation, cet autre “obstacle à la paix” dénoncé dès les années 1970 par le président Carter, mais à peine mentionnée dans les déclarations de ces derniers jours (y compris au G8 de Deauville) et qui se poursuit sur le terrain : les limites de Jérusalem ont été encore étendues le 25 mai, avec de nouvelles constructions en perspective…

Aussi bien, sans s’opposer ouvertement aux tentatives d’un président américain moins bien disposé à son égard que son prédécesseur George W. Bush, Israël prèfère s’appuyer sur ses alliés de l’Aipac (totalement pris en main par le Likoud, le parti de la droite israélienne) et leurs amis au Congrès américain. Il est significatif que son discours devant les deux chambres, le 24 mai, ait été salué par 26 “ovations debout” contre 25 pour Barack Obama devant la même enceinte en janvier…

Face à tout cela, Barack Obama n’a visiblement pas de nouveau “plan de paix” à proposer, encore moins à imposer, et ne songe pas à remplacer, en tous cas pour le moment, son envoyé spécial George Mitchell qui, après trois ans de tentatives infructueuses, a fini par jeter l’éponge le 13 mai, dès avant ces nouveaux échanges. A part le dernier accrochage sur les frontières de 1967, il soutient Israël sur tous les autres plans, refusant notamment de cautionner le rapprochement récemment survenu entre le Fatah et le Hamas, tout comme les tentatives de faire reconnaître par l’assemblée générale de l’ONU un Etat palestinien.

C’est pourtant sur ce plan que les choses pourraient changer à moyen terme. L’accord Fatah-Hamas conclu début mai ne porte que sur le principe – mais pas sur le détail – d’élections législatives et présidentielles à tenir l’an prochain sur tout le territoire palestinien, suivies par la constitution d’un gouvernement commun. Il ne parle pas de négociation avec Israël, ni de sa reconnaissance – sans non plus exclure l’une ou l’autre – mais reflète la déception du président Mahmoud Abbas, qui s’estime mal récompensé de sa longue coopération avec Israël. Surtout, il a été conclu sous l’égide de l’Egypte, dont le nouveau gouvernement a rompu avec les pratiques d’Hosni Moubarak sur un point important : alors que ce dernier voyait dans le Hamas les alliés des Frères musulmans, ses ennemis de l’intérieur, les militaires aujourd’hui au pouvoir au Caire s’appuient sur ces derniers et dénoncent à leur tour le blocus de Gaza. Depuis le 27 mai, la frontière est ouverte “en permanence” avec le territoire palestinien, après une ouverture partielle au début du mois. Certes, des restrictions demeurent : seules les femmes et les enfants peuvent circuler librement de part et d’autre de la frontière, pas les hommes en âge de combattre, ni non plus les marchandises – y compris le béton, pourtant bien nécessaire à la reconstruction après les destructions de l’opération “Plomb durci”. Bref, le Caire reste prudent, et c’est pourquoi Israël, malgré ses inquiétudes sur les envois d’armes à Gaza, a évité de réagir dans l’immédiat.

Cela dit, le désaccord reste clair sur un point au moins entre Israël et la communauté internationale, Etats-Unis compris : l’urgence d’un accord. Alors que Benjamin Netanyahou et son gouvernement s’accommodent visiblement de l’impasse – un de ses membres estime que les “négociations” pourraient s’étaler sur plusieurs années, voire un siècle… – le reste du monde juge, avec Barack Obama, que le statu quo n’est pas tenable, ne serait-ce qu’en raison de l’évolution démographique et des bouleversements dans la région. La France envisage une prochaine initiative en ce sens, estimant même que l’accord Hamas-Fatah est une bonne chose. La reconnaissance d’un Etat palestinien par l’ONU ne reste encore qu’une hypothèse compte tenu d’un veto américain probable, mais il sera difficile d’éviter un important débat sur le sujet en septembre à New York.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Hurting Moderates, Helping Militants

By Nathan Thrall, a Middle East analyst at the International Crisis Group (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 05/05/11):

The rival Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah officially agreed this week to reconcile and form a unity government. In response, Israel has decided to punish the Palestinian Authority by withholding two-thirds of its annual revenues. It’s a tactic Israel tried after Hamas won parliamentary elections in 2006 — and it will probably have as little success now as it did then.

Blocking the funds that pay the salaries of civil servants would destroy the Fatah-dominated West Bank’s relative prosperity, turning it into something resembling the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. There, several years of isolation have led not to the weakening of Hamas but to the strengthening of even more uncompromising enemies of the Jewish state.

In Gaza, the number of Salafi jihadis — austere militants willing to kill those they don’t consider true Muslims — has grown significantly since 2006. Many of them are former Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters who see Hamas as caving to Israel while getting only blockades, closed border crossings and military incursions in return.

Three weeks ago, a group of Salafi jihadis strangled Vittorio Arrigoni, a 36-year-old Italian activist who had advocated an end to the blockade of Gaza. Mr. Arrigoni’s killers posted a video showing him bloodied and blindfolded while scrolling text denounced Hamas for not instituting Islamic law in Gaza. It also demanded the release of all Salafi jihadi prisoners, especially Hisham Saidani, leader of a small group named Tawhid and Jihad. Earlier this year, he issued a religious ruling permitting the killing of Jewish and Christian civilians because they “are fundamentally not innocent.”

Like other Salafi jihadi groups in Gaza, Tawhid and Jihad has few members, its organization is poor, and its ability to threaten Gaza’s government is slight. Yet with a single rocket or a single murder, such groups can drastically change the fate of Gazans by scaring off their foreign supporters or provoking another war.

Embarrassed by Mr. Arrigoni’s murder, Hamas held a state funeral for him, offered to name a street in his honor, and on April 19 sent snipers and security forces to confront his suspected executioners, two of whom were killed in the raid.

Some in Israel hope that such bloodletting between two of the Jewish state’s enemies will result in their mutual destruction, but such thinking has proven faulty before.

In the mid-1980s, members of the Israeli government sought to weaken the Palestinian Liberation Organization by strengthening Islamists who would go on to form Hamas, a strategy that leading Israeli defense officials have since acknowledged was a mistake.

So was the closing of Gaza’s borders. Five years of isolation have not dislodged Hamas, revived the peace process, strengthened Fatah or ensured Israel’s security. Most of the Gaza Strip’s imports now pass largely unimpeded through tunnels that are wide enough to carry cattle, cars, anti-tank missiles and foreign radicals.

Nor has isolating Hamas persuaded most Palestinians to embrace the alternative model in the West Bank, where undemocratic practices remain common, local leaders lack popular legitimacy, and tight security coordination with Israel is routinely denounced.

Instead, blockading Gaza and isolating Hamas have given rhetorical strength to militants who argue that the Islamist movement has erred by holding its fire against Israel and failing to impose Islamic law. As a result, Hamas is slowly losing members to more radical groups.

On Monday, Hamas self-defeatingly sought to bolster its flagging Islamist credentials by mourning the death of Osama bin Laden and praising him as an Arab holy warrior — just days after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ominously warned that “Israel would not recognize any government in the world that included members from Al Qaeda.”

In reality, the likelihood of such a government is slight, but if Israel continues to oppose Palestinian reconciliation, Mr. Netanyahu’s nightmare may become less of a fantasy.

Repeating the mistakes of the past will only strengthen Hamas’s Salafi jihadi challengers, who proliferated the last time Palestinians were penalized for their votes and could one day pose an even greater threat to Israel.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Arab uprising: The U.S. must take a nonviolent stance

By Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of history and international relations at Boston University and the author of Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (LOS ANGELES TIMES, 01/05/11):

As Arab dominoes teeter and topple, Washington finds itself caught on the horns of a dilemma. Where should America place its bets? Which is more likely to serve U. S. interests: propping up the existing order or trying something new? Sticking with the familiar or taking a flyer on change?

Thus far, the Obama administration has tried to split the difference, favoring the removal of nasty autocrats except where it doesn’t. As a result, loudly proclaimed moral arguments provide a rationale for hammering Moammar Kadafi’s Libya with airstrikes; tacitly understood prudential considerations require giving Bahrain’s King Hamed ibn Isa Khalifa a pass.

This approach opens the United States to charges of hypocrisy. Yet worse than the appearance of double standards are the results. The administration’s principal achievement thus far has been to buy itself what it needs least: another war, one that looks less righteous, less purposeful and less susceptible to resolution with each passing day.

Can the United States formulate a response to the Arab uprising that reconciles the moral with the prudential — a strategy producing positive outcomes consistent with conscience rather than just digging deeper holes? The answer is yes; indeed, such an approach is staring us in the face. Gandhi and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. had a name for it: nonviolence — the conviction that principled civil resistance can ultimately prevail against even sustained brutality.

Challenged by popular resistance movements that are difficult to suppress and won’t be bought off, decrepit and desperate regimes throughout the Arab world are, in effect, engaged in committing serial suicide. By demonstrating their incapacity and unworthiness to govern, they forfeit legitimacy. Whether the end comes quickly or slowly, is messy or neat, it comes. In Tunisia and Egypt, it already has. In Yemen, the timetable appears set. In Bahrain, Syria and perhaps elsewhere, the clock is ticking, loudly and insistently. Although Libya’s Kadafi is testing the proposition that brute force can turn back that clock, his efforts are doomed to fail. Even if he “wins” the ongoing civil war, victory will leave Kadafi a pariah, with his regime living on borrowed time.

Frozen in place for decades, the Arab world is thawing, with big change in the offing. As events have made clear, Washington’s ability to direct this process (or even to anticipate its course) is negligible. Whether Arabs end up being governed by liberals or Islamists — or Rotarians, for that matter — is something that they themselves will decide.

What should concern the United States is less the evolving substance of Arab politics than the form — not the destination but the means employed to get there. After all, a region in which marches and demonstrations supplant bombs, torture and arbitrary imprisonment as the currency of everyday politics just might be able to manage its own affairs, without constant American supervision. For a United States suffering from severe overstretch, that defines strategic success.

Any nation wishing to see the politics of give-and-take displace the politics of coercion ought to set an appropriate example. This the United States has not done. Through arms sales and giveaways, its military presence and its propensity for intervention, the U.S. has for decades underwritten and encouraged violence as the mainstay of Middle East politics. Washington has talked peace while promoting war.

In this regard, President Obama’s ongoing Libya intervention qualifies as simply more of the same. The president’s preference for air power over ground troops cannot disguise what continues to be a reflexive American reliance on force.

In the Middle East, bloodletting begets more bloodshed. The dynamic of the Arab uprising — placard-waving protesters filling the central square — offers the possibility of breaking this cycle. To seize the opportunity, the United States should embrace three principles. First, support and celebrate those pursuing change through peaceful means, whatever their political agenda. Second, condemn without exception those who resort to guns and truncheons, whether their aim is to promote change or avert it. Third, foreswear any further use of force as an instrument of U.S. policy in the Arab world, thereby demonstrating that we are committed to fostering an approach to politics in which violence will play no part.

The militarization of U.S. policy in the Middle East, dating from the promulgation of the Carter doctrine in 1980, has produced much pain and little gain. Prudential and moral imperatives alike demand that the United States change course. The chance to begin doing so is at hand.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona