What next for Kyrgyzstan?

THE WASHINGTON POST, 16/04/10:

Last week Roza Otunbayeva led a group in Kyrgyzstan that ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev from power after protesters stormed the president’s offices; at least 84 people were killed. Newsweek-Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth reached Otunbayeva by phone to discuss the current situation. Excerpts:

What actually caused the outbreak of violence last week?

A number of reasons. There was a lot of corruption, and then in terms of transparency, Kyrgyzstan is 166th out of 180 countries. We are a country with such a low quality of life. But since January 1, President Bakiyev and his government started to raise the price for utilities — for electricity, for hot water, for mobile companies, for water for agricultural needs, [and his government also increased] taxes on real estate. Everything was done simultaneously. Then they started to sell strategic companies for nothing. A very big electricity company, which supplied electricity to Bishkek [the capital], was sold for $3 million, which is nothing. And they were corrupt — in fact, the utility company was sold to the son of Bakiyev.

Wasn’t there a lot of corruption surrounding contracts for the U.S. Air Force base?

I can’t tell you now. Today I met with [Assistant U.S. Secretary of State] Robert Blake, and he said they are ready to open up and make things transparent regarding this issue.

The overthrow was a combination of rising electricity prices and corruption and the sale of those companies?

And political repression and such a dramatic fall of human rights issues in my country. . . . All the papers and TV and radio [stations] were closed . . . the State Department human rights report . . . provided a very thorough description of our situation.

Some say Bakiyev’s overthrow was orchestrated with Russian support.

I do not agree with that. Bakiyev closed Russian TV channels in Kyrgyzstan; he closed Internet sites where the situation was described. Then the Russian press started to show what was the face of the authorities so that was probably counted as Russian support. But that was a correct reflection of the situation in Kyrgyzstan.

You said you would extend the base rights for the U.S. for a year when the lease runs out [in July].

It is not a matter of extension because it goes automatically. . . . This is not a high priority for us — for this interim government.

But you understand the air base is a high priority for the U.S.

Certainly we pay great attention to our relations with the U.S. We value those relations and we will continue with such long-term relations.

Would the interim government like economic and military aid [from the United States]?

A unique opportunity has opened up in Kyrgyzstan to deal with democracy. We started to go towards democracy, and it was interrupted. Now there is a chance to come back to democracy, and in half a year, my interim government should prepare elections — open and transparent elections — and we should pass a constitution based on political agreement between the parties. We have quite a task.

That is your aim — to pass the constitution and prepare elections in the next six months?

Exactly. To stabilize life, to bring back normalcy . . . and to make a difference for the people. To show that this team will be different by nature — not corrupt — with good morals and good governance.

It is alleged that the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye on the corruption [by the prior regime] to get the president’s support for the air base.

Regarding corruption around the base, we should open up the facts, and then I will talk. I would say that we have been really unhappy that the U.S. Embassy here was absolutely not interested in the democratic situation in Kyrgyzstan. It was not paying attention to our difficulties over the last two years.

We were not happy that they never had the time to meet with us. We concluded that the base is the most important agenda of the U.S., not our political development and the suffering of the opposition and the closing the papers and the beating of journalists. They turned a blind eye.

The prior government was beating journalists?

A lot of journalists are gone. They are refugees in other countries. One journalist was stabbed 26 times. Another journalist was killed and thrown from the sixth floor [of a building].

How do you see the long-term relationship with the U.S.?

We are now talking with the embassy and Mr. Blake, and they want to offer us as much support as possible, and they confessed that it was very difficult to work with the previous government. Now it sounds like the objectives of our governments are the same. They will help us.

You were foreign minister in a previous government, a leader in the 2005 Tulip Revolution.

I was also the ambassador to the U.S. and to the U.K.

Then you were pushed aside by Bakiyev and went into opposition, correct?

Right, I was the leader of the opposition faction in the parliament.

How did a woman like you manage to keep going during these difficult times?

I am a fighter. I believe in the bright future of my country. I believe that the people of my country deserve a decent life, and I know that my people want to live in freedom.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Running in Circles in Kyrgyzstan

By Eric McGlinchey, an assistant professor of government and politics at George Mason University (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 10/04/10):

Whenever I am in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, I wake early and run in the central stadium. I enjoy it for two reasons: first, it’s one of the few places where I can exercise without Bishkek’s feral dogs attacking my ankles, and, second, that I actually run on the track provides endless amusement for the gaggle of Kyrgyz politicians I lap as they amble and shoot the breeze.

Some of my stadium acquaintances hold positions of power. Others do not. This week, those on the in and those on the out swapped places. I’m certain, though, that it will be the same gaggle at the track next week, negotiating ever-changing alliances while the rest of Bishkek sleeps.

For those unfamiliar with Kyrgyz politics, it must appear strange that Roza Otunbayeva, who emerged from this week’s coup as the nation’s interim leader, was foreign minister for both Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akayev, and for the man who ousted Mr. Akayev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev (who himself was forced to flee Bishkek on Wednesday). Stranger still is that after each stint Ms. Otunbayeva subsequently joined the “opposition” and played a central role in the downfall of her boss.

As my experience at the stadium shows, however, concepts like opposition and political parties prove an uncomfortable fit with Kyrgyz politics. The press would do well to drop these terms and begin to analyze the political dynamic for what it actually is — a handful of political elites going in circles — rather than in terms suggestive of what we hope Kyrgyzstan can become, a competitive democracy.

Let me be clear: What happened on Wednesday was not a revolution — it was a hijacking.

Being president of Kyrgyzstan shares much in common with being captain of a plane. The president needs a few people to help him rule, say a first officer and a navigator. Should one of these assistants prove problematic, the president can replace him with someone from the passenger cabin. The challenge, though, is that the passenger cabin is small. Eventually, the president must re-use the same people he previously fired or he must fly solo. At the same time, he remains vulnerable to passengers banding together, as they did this week, and tossing him from the plane.

This makes Kyrgyzstan very different from its ex-Soviet neighbors. Why aren’t the presidents of countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both of whom have been in power since the Soviet Union collapsed, so easily tossed from power? The answer is straightforward: the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents have bigger planes — 747s compared to Kyrgyzstan’s Cessna.

Should a minister falter or be seen as disloyal, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan can find ready replacements from within the ranks of hundreds of loyal cadres, many of them holdovers from the bureaucracy of the Soviet system. Moreover, because Kazakh and Uzbek ministers know they can easily be replaced, they are far less likely to prove meddlesome in the first place.

The differences trace back to the 1980s, when the Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz political elites were all rocked by riots during Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms. Moscow directly intervened to restore political order during riots in Kazakhstan in 1986 and Uzbekistan in 1989. In February 1990, however, Mr. Gorbachev decreed an end to the Communist Party’s monopoly on power and effectively told leaders in the Soviet republics that their problems were, well, their problems.

So when riots came to the Kyrgyz Republic in June 1990, no steady outside hand followed to restore order to Bishkek’s bickering party elite. And while the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents entered the post-Soviet period with a united, albeit renamed single party, Kyrgyzstan’s new president, Askar Akayev, had to scramble to put together a piecemeal political system, which has never matured.

The United States and Russia provide hundreds of millions in aid to Kyrgyzstan each year, largely in exchange for the use of air bases, but the money has done little to stabilize the country or promote democracy. In fact, Russia’s desire to see the Americans evicted created a military bidding war, the spoils of which only fueled Kyrgyzstan’s political chaos.

Kyrgyzstan is a failed state that needs a couple of steady outside hands to help it succeed. When President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia visits Washington next week, President Obama needs to convince him that the United States has no interest in remaking the political status quo in Central Asia. This means affirming what Vladimir Putin, Russia’s prime minister and de facto leader, has already stated: that President Bakiyev — now in hiding in southern Kyrgyzstan — must resign and that we recognize Ms. Otunbayeva’s interim government as the legitimate authority.

Kyrgyzstan is in Russia’s backyard, and the fact that we depend on our air base there for our Afghan war doesn’t change that. Presenting a united front with Russia, however, would help Washington keep its air base and avoid another bidding war. It would also provide some political equilibrium that might keep those now on the outs in Bishkek from hijacking the Kyrgyz state again.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Out of Kyrgyzstan’s chaos, another chance for democracy

By Alexey Semyonov, vice president of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation, a nonprofit that promotes civil society and democratic development in the former Soviet Union and Baktybek Abdrisaev, a visiting professor of history and political science at Utah Valley University. He was Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States and Canada from 1997 to 2005 (THE WASHINGTON POST, 09/04/10):

Events in Kyrgyzstan have once again seized headlines. Five years ago, in March 2005, the Tulip Revolution blossomed: Crowds upset by a falsified election stormed the main government building in Bishkek, the capital, and chased out then-President Askar Akayev. This week, after widespread riots in which security forces opened fire on opposition protesters, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev escaped the capital in a plane. A temporary people’s government announced that it has taken power, with former foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva in charge.

For Kyrgyzstan, a mountainous nation that prided itself on being an “island of democracy” in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, events represent a second chance to get back on track. This opportunity comes at a heavy cost — hundreds have been injured and at least 75 people killed — and these sacrifices will be in vain if another revolt is provoked in a few years by the same plagues of corruption and despotism. But it is significant that of the former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan is the only nation that has forced regime change. The people are clearly willing to fight for their rights. The test now is whether the country can also provide for peaceful transitions.

Otunbayeva is an erudite and experienced diplomat and parliamentarian who has the credibility and track record to lead the country. Her first task is to prove that she and her emergency cabinet can get the violence under control. Looters have run rampant through Bishkek’s grocery stores and malls. Armed mobs have stolen guns from police. Rumors are circulating that Bakiyev flew to the city of Osh, his regional stronghold, and is gathering supporters for a standoff.

Otunbayeva must show that her government will not pursue personal vendettas at the expense of forging national unity, nor stoke regional rivalries within the country by making irresponsible appointments. It is key that the government refrain from redistributing among officials the same property and assets that the Bakiyev regime took from Akayev.

Policy statements in these early days should focus on the people’s grievances: worsening living conditions and rampant corruption. Part of Otunbayeva’s message should be the need to pursue constitutional changes that Bakiyev rejected in his bids to centralize power in the presidency and put the country under the control of his family and close associates.

Otunbayeva would do well to tap into the seeds of democracy and pluralism that were planted after Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991: She could start by improving oversight of the government by Kyrgyzstan’s beleaguered but experienced nongovernmental organizations, fostering a robust media environment that publicizes competing views, and holding democratic elections that convey legitimacy on a new government.

For the Obama administration, there’s a powerful lesson in this week’s events: The U.S. government’s policy of supporting security at the expense of democracy has come back to bite the United States. For the past several years, the United States has been noticeably quiet while the Bakiyev regime has held rigged elections, trampled on human rights and resorted to violence to silence the opposition and independent media; U.S. behavior has most likely been out of deference to the Bakiyev regime for allowing the U.S. military to operate Manas Air Base, which supports operations in Afghanistan. In fact, on the day his father was forced to flee the capital, the president’s son Maxim Bakiyev was scheduled to be in Washington for bilateral consultations and to drum up investment in the impoverished country.

The United States could play a role in helping the opposition deal with the considerable economic and political challenges facing Kyrgyzstan. Washington should encourage the citizen government to work with the people in an honest and open way. It could also seek to maintain its security relationship while encouraging Kyrgyzstan to find common ground with the country’s long-standing partner, Russia. Following the acting government’s decision to dismiss parliament and hold elections, the United States and other nations should offer technical assistance to ensure free and fair elections.

Rarely do countries get the chance to remake themselves so quickly. Governments change, but problems often remain. The new Kyrgyz leadership has a chance to address the country’s pressing problems, and the United States could improve its Kyrgyz policy in the process.

Fuente: Bitácora Almendrón. Tribuna Libre © Miguel Moliné Escalona

Adiós, Manás

Por Jesús López-Medel, abogado del Estado. Ex presidente de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la OSCE (EL PERIÓDICO, 26/02/09):

De allí partieron en su último viaje. El último pedazo de tierra que pisaron estaba muy lejos de su país. Subieron a un avión del que algunos ya habían expresado a sus familiares sus temores, a pesar de sus abundantes horas de vuelo y su capacidad de sacrificio. Quienes hemos viajado con frecuencia a esos lugares evitábamos siempre esos aviones de fabricación soviética, los yakovlev, tupovlev, etcétera. Ellos no podían elegir. Eran militares. El Yak-42 despegaría para siempre de Bhisket hace ya seis años, hasta llegar a nunca jamás.

Kirguistán es uno de los cinco países ex soviéticos que integran Asia Central. Es ahora noticia por lo que supone la pérdida de la última base militar utilizada por Estados Unidos en esa inmensa región para apoyar a sus acciones en Afganistán. Tras los atentados del 11-S del 2001 en Nueva York, una de las reacciones de George Bush fue invadir Afganistán en la operación Libertad Duradera. Buscaban a Osama bin Laden y pretendían derrocar a los fanáticos talibanes que ellos mismos antes habían apoyado y armado para expulsar a los invasores soviéticos. Tuvieron el respaldo militar de muchas estados aliados.

POLÍTICAMENTE, todos bendecirían la acción. Incluso la Rusia de entonces que, al tiempo, estaba desplegando una acción muy represora en Chechenia. Les venía muy bien el todo vale norteamericano contra el terrorismo para seguir aniquilando ellos a los separatistas caucásicos. Para la invasión y guerra que desde entonces se vive allí, además del apoyo político y logístico de Pakistán, era necesario que desde otro flanco también las tropas pudieran tener bases de apoyo. En aquel tiempo, apenas 12 años después de desmantelarse la URSS, EEUU tendría todas las facilidades. Dos lugares estratégicos para su Ejército eran las bases que permitirían utilizar Uzbekistán y Kirguistán, antaño ruta de la seda, hoy de la droga. El primero, frontera con Afganistán, es una nación con gran historia donde está la mítica Samarcanda y otras ciudades aún más bellas, como Khiba y Bukhara. El despotismo y la represión causaron en el 2006 una matanza de casi 1.000 personas. Las condenas occidentales provocaron en el dictador Karimov el repliegue y la expulsión de EEUU de la base que le permitía, hasta entonces, utilizar Uzbekistán.

Solo quedaba, pues, la base de Manás situada en la capital de Kirguizistán. En ella, junto a las tropas yanquis, hay un contingente de 60 españoles. Hacen labores de apoyo a los compatriotas que están en el país afgano. Ahora han de volver.

Kirguistán, un país con abundantes y bellas montañas, ha decidido que el Ejército norteamericano debe marcharse. Otra dificultad más en los polvorines que Bush le ha dejado a su sucesor. Tras el progresivo abandono de Irak, la nueva Administración de Barack Obama se centrará en el avispero de Afganistán, aunque parece que allí puede haber un cambio de estrategia. La creciente influencia rusa en todo el espacio soviético, una vez recuperada tras evaporarse la URSS, ha sido determinante en esa expulsión.

De allí han de volver nuestros militares que, en turnos de pocos meses, rotaban. Algunos nunca volvieron. En mayo del 2003, 62 militares españoles fueron embarcados en ese avión de fabricación ucraniana. Horas después, la aeronave se estrellaba en Turquía. El cierre de la base de Manás requiere un recuerdo para ellos.

Allí estuve en dos ocasiones visitando a las tropas españolas en unas condiciones de seguridad casi bélicas administradas por las autoridades norteamericanas. Junto a la entereza y sacrificio de nuestros militares, recordaré siempre lo que allí vi.

Hicimos una ofrenda en recuerdo de quienes ocuparon el avión que tendría como destino la muerte. Fue una gran sorpresa que la placa conmemorativa de ellos estuviese escrita en inglés: “To the brothers and sisters…“. Pregunté el motivo, y se me dijo que había sido colocada por EEUU. Desde aquí, además de muertos, olvidados. Al regresar a España, comenté este hecho con algunas personas del ámbito político. Dos años y medio después, en diciembre del 2007, volví al país kirguiz de nuevo como observador internacional de la OSCE. Una vez más quise rendir homenaje a nuestros militares. La placa única seguía allí sola, colocada sobre la misma roca. Pude de nuevo echar en falta que no hubiera en español un recuerdo semejante. Junto a la emoción, volví a sentir pena.

EN 180 DÍAS el Ejército norteamericano debe abandonar Manás. Con ellos lo hará también el contingente español. Seguirán atendiendo a los compromisos internacionales de apoyo a nuestro aliado. Los militares no deben expresar sus temores o sus dudas. Así, tal vez ellos piensen que están allí en misión de paz en lucha contra el terrorismo internacional. Muchos civiles tenemos dudas sobre su utilidad, dada la inmensa complejidad orográfica del país afgano. En cualquier caso, desde sus planteamientos militares, ellos actúan guiados por la profesionalidad, la abnegación y el sacrificio que les caracteriza.

Cuando regresen de Kirguistán, que traigan la placa. Que sirva para mantener vivo el recuerdo de nuestros muertos. Tal vez la Ministra de Defensa, Carme Chacón, quiera rendirles honores a ellos y a sus familiares haciendo que esa placa, escrita en inglés, quede, junto a su memoria, en un lugar digno, aquí en España.

Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm

Asia Briefing N°79 (CRISIS GROUP, 14/08/08):

OVERVIEW

Long viewed as a relatively liberal aberration in Central Asia’s authoritarian landscape, Kyrgyzstan has since the autumn of 2007 transformed its political system into a functional one-party state ruled by a small elite, with President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s family at its core. The key change came in December when, after an electoral campaign widely criticised for blatant bias in favour of the ruling party, a new parliament was returned that is dominated by Ak Zhol, President Bakiyev’s newly-created political machine, with decorative roles assigned to two parties that were apportioned seats in contravention to the electoral code. The opposition, sidelined by events, has lapsed into apathy, and a superficial calm has overtaken the usually boisterous political scene. This calm may, however, prove deceptive, given worsening corruption, increasing disillusionment with politics and a series of major economic crises that could strike before year’s end.

Thus far the changes have achieved one result: parliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan has been hobbled. The task of the new legislature, presidential aides say bluntly, is to implement the president’s will with minimal discussion and zero dissent. Though the innovations bear strong resemblances to both the Kazakh and Russian political systems, they were not introduced because of outside pressure. They are a good example of how the Vladimir Putin model of governance is being copied in Central Asia for personal interest rather than ideological affinity.

The president’s team was motivated purely by the desire to concentrate power in its hands. Bakiyev’s advisers claim they want to break out of the political paralysis and infighting that has marked the time since independence in 1991. The liberal democratic model has failed, they say; the Russian model of limited democracy, a marginalised opposition and strong presidential power is far better suited to the country at this stage in its development. They speak of pushing through over the next two years a program of radical privatisation, particularly of energy resources. Though there has been little sign of this so far, the ruling elite remains committed to selling off large parts of the country’s energy infrastructure as soon as it can.

The changes seem less a revolution than an intensified version of policies pursued by Bakiyev’s predecessor, Askar Akayev. The Akayev administration also concentrated power in family members and close supporters, played opposition factions off against each other, but was eventually overthrown in 2005 by the disgruntled political and business elite, led by Bakiyev, in the grandiloquently named Tulip Revolution. Instead of opening up politics, however, Bakiyev, too, is creating a system whose hallmarks are overweening control by the ruling family, widespread corruption and, most significantly, a monopoly over economic and political patronage. Critics allege that the newly strengthened political dispensation will simply transfer key national assets to the president’s relatives and close supporters.

There is concern also that Bakiyev’s “national agenda” is in fact a collection of personal, short-term priorities, and that major issues in need of attention – among them grinding poverty, HIV/AIDS and narcotics – will be ignored. Given the opposition’s disarray, there is little likelihood that Bakiyev’s plans will face any serious political challenge in the short run. He seems determined to stay in office until 2015 and then hand over to a successor who can be trusted to defend his family interests.

First, however, the Bakiyev administration has to survive the next winter. The success of the election operation infused the president’s team with a sense of infallibity that borders on hubris. The challenges it is facing now, however, are infinitely more complex than choreographing an election.

Inflation is developing disconcerting momentum. Food prices increased in the first six months of the year by at least 20 per cent. A major energy crisis, triggered by domestic factors, not world prices, is looming. Government handling of these issues has not been impressive. Complacency and vague talk of emergency plans has given way to appeals for outside aid, calls for a 30 per cent cut in winter electricity consumption and warnings there will be only enough power for light, not heating. Even more disturbing for the regime, perhaps, is growing speculation within society that it is not just mishandling the economy, but that corrupt members of the Bakiyev administration themselves contributed to the energy crisis. Such street talk is often based on little more than gossip but is frequently a sign of eroding confidence in the state. Many observers, including some presidential advisers, feel that pent-up popular anger – at spiralling food and fuel prices, power cuts and drastically declining public services – could well erupt when the weather turns cold.

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